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Abstract. As deep learning systems are widely adopted in safety- and security-
critical applications, such as autonomous vehicles, banking systems, etc., mali-
cious faults and attacks become a tremendous concern, which potentially could
lead to catastrophic consequences. In this paper, we initiate the first study of lever-
aging physical fault injection attacks on Deep Neural Networks (DNNs), by us-
ing laser injection technique on embedded systems. In particular, our exploratory
study targets four widely used activation functions in DNNs development, that
are the general main building block of DNNs that creates non-linear behaviors
– ReLu, softmax, sigmoid, and tanh. Our results show that by targeting these
functions, it is possible to achieve a misclassification by injecting faults into the
hidden layer of the network. Such result can have practical implications for real-
world applications, where faults can be introduced by simpler means (such as
altering the supply voltage).
Keywords: deep learning security, fault attacks, adversarial attacks
1 Introduction
Internet of things (IoT) and artificial intelligence (AI) are the two integral components
of modern paradigms like smart city, self-driving cars etc. Recent advancement in AI
has made it applicable to complex scenarios. The most efficient AI is known in the
form of deep learning which has achieved great leaps of progress in many application
domains, such as computer vision, robotics, gaming, finance, medical systems [16].
In parallel, IoT has pushed the computing elements (and sensors) outside traditional
boundaries and motivates to place them everywhere. This has also enabled easy physical
access to the computing elements which was not possible previously.
We look at a specific class of physical attacks known as fault attacks, which has
become a reality owing to decreasing price and expertise required to mount such at-
tack. Fault attacks are active attacks on a given implementation which try to perturb
the internal software computations by external means. The adversary uses methods like
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voltage glitches or laser injection to introduce perturbations for various purposes, rang-
ing from erroneous computation, denial of service etc. Such attacks are commonly used
for mounting secret key recovery attacks in cryptography or violate/bypass security
checks [21]. In this work, we analyze deep learning under fault attacks.
Deep learning is the family of neural networks composed of an input layer, three
or more hidden layers and an output layer. Based on the internal structure, several can-
didates exist like multi-layer perceptron (MLP), convolutional neural networks (CNN),
recurrent neural network (RNN) etc. These are popularly known as deep neural net-
works (DNN). While each of these architectures has unique functions, we focus on
activation functions which remain common across architectures and are an important
part of the algorithm to obtain non-linear behaviors [18]. These commonly used activa-
tion functions are: softmax, ReLu, sigmoid and tanh. Studying these functions under
fault attacks allows to derive general conclusions on susceptibility of deep learning to
fault attacks.
We implemented the most common activation functions used across DNNs on a
low-cost microcontroller (often used in IoT). Next, we performed practical laser fault
injection using a near-infrared diode pulse laser to inject faults during the processing of
activation function. The use of laser facilitates a strong attacker model with extensive
fault injection capabilities. With the models, derived from practical fault injection, we
analyze the susceptibility of DNN against such attacks. The primary goal of the per-
formed attacks is to achieve misclassification during the testing phase. In the hindsight,
the achieved misclassification can jeopardize the functioning of DNN-based paradigms
like smart city.
Extensive studies have been performed on adversarial attacks, that crafts the input
data with little perturbation to fool deep learning systems [19,20,28,13,12,11,29]. To
the best of our knowledge, our study is the first work to explore practical (physical)
fault injection on deep neural network, where we focus on attacking the DNNs itself
instead of creating input data to fool DNNs like adversarial attack does.
2 Background
2.1 Fault Injection Attacks
Fault injection attacks are a popular physical attack vector used against cryptographic
circuits [5]. By changing intermediate values during the cryptographic algorithm exe-
cution, they can efficiently provide information on secret values, helping to recover the
secret key in just a few encryptions [7,8,10]. Normally, the secret key recovery would re-
quire infeasible amount of computing time. Similarly, these attacks can be used against
verification circuits, such as PIN verification on a smartcard, where a comparison func-
tion can be skipped and grant access to a malicious user [17].
When it comes to fault injection techniques, there are several options one can use,
mostly depending on the adversary budget and expertise [4]. The most basic methods
include variations in voltage or clock signal, allowing disturbance of instruction se-
quences in microcontrollers [3]. Electromagnetic fault injection allows more precise
location targeting, enabling faults in memories [22,26]. Laser fault injection is the most
precise from commonly used techniques, being capable of flipping single bits [2].
Up to date, to the best of our knowledge, only [25] describes fault injection attack
on neural networks. In their paper, they only provide a white box attack on deep neural
network through software simulation, while observing the changes in the output after
introducing faults in the network’s values. However, they do not provide insight on
practicality of such attack. Whether such attacks could also be applied physically re-
mained an open problem. Therefore, in our paper, we experimentally show what types
of faults are achievable in practice and we further use this information to develop a
realistic attack on DNNs.
2.2 Activation Functions
The activation functions we consider are the following: softmax, ReLu, sigmoid and
Tanh [18].
Softmax is normally used as the activation function for output layer. It takes a vector
x as input, ith entry of the output gives the probability of a given input belonging to class
i:
softmax(x)i =
exp(xi)∑
j exp(x j)
,
where exp is the exponentiation function with base e.
In modern neural networks, the default recommendation for activation function is
the rectified linear unit or ReLu defined as follows:
ReLu(x) = max{0, x}.
It is a piecewise linear function which preserves properties that make the optimization
of linear model easy.
Before the introduction of ReLu, commonly used activation functions are logistic
sigmoid activation function
sigmoid(x) =
1
1 + exp(−x) ,
and hyperbolic tangent function
tanh(x) =
2
1 + exp(−2x) − 1.
The sigmoid function is normally used to introduce non-linearity in the model. A
reason for its popularity comes from the simple equation between its derivative and
itself: sigmoid′(x) = sigmoid(x)(1− sigmoid(x)). However, sigmoid functions becomes
insensitive to inputs with large absolute values. In such cases, the hyperbolic tangent
activation function is used as an alternative.
3 Practical DNN Attack Feasibility Analysis
In this part we first show the practical laser fault attack setup in Section 3.1. In Sec-
tion 3.2 we show the possible fault attacks on activation functions that we have discov-
ered with practical experiments. In Section 4, those attacks will be used for simulating
missclassification attacks on MNIST DNNs.
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Fig. 1: Experimental laser fault injection setup – (a) device under test, (b) setup compo-
nents.
3.1 Attack Equipment Setup
The main component of the experimental laser fault injection station is the diode pulse
laser. It has a wavelength of 1064 nm and pulse power of 20 W. This power is further
reduced to 8 W by a 20× objective lens which reduces the spot size to 15×3.5 µm2.
As the device under test (DUT), we used ATmega328P microcontroller, mounted on
Arduino UNO development board. The package of this chip was opened so that there is
a direct visibility on a back-side silicon die with a laser. The board was placed on an XYZ
positioning table with the step precision of 0.05 µm in each direction. A trigger signal
was sent from the device at the beginning of the computation so that the injection time
could be precisely determined. After the trigger signal was captured by the trigger and
control device, a specified delay was inserted before laser activation. Laser activation
timing was also checked by a digital oscilloscope for a greater precision. Our setup is
depicted in Figure 1.
The chip area is 3×3 mm2 large, while the area sensitive to laser is ≈ 50×70 µm2
large. With a laser power of 4.5% we were able to disturb the algorithm execution, when
tested with reference codes.
3.2 DNN Activation Function Fault Analysis
To evaluate different activation functions, we implemented three simple 3-layer neural
networks with sigmoid, ReLu and tanh as the activation function for the second layer
respectively. The activation function for the last layer was set to be softmax. The neural
networks were implemented in C programming language, which were further compiled
to AVR assembly and uploaded to the DUT.
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Fig. 2: Area plot depicting successful instruction skip experiments.
We surrounded the activation functions in the second layer with a trigger signal that
raised a voltage on a selected Arduino board pin to 5 V, helping us to determine the
proper laser timing.
As instruction skip/change are one of the most basic attacks on microcontrollers,
with high repeatability rates [10], we aimed at this fault model in our experiments. The
microcontroller clock is 16 MHz, one instruction takes 62.5 ns. Some of the activation
functions took over 2000 instructions to execute. To check what are the vulnerabilities
of the implementations, we have carefully varied the timing of the laser glitch from
the beginning until the end of the function execution so that every instruction would be
eventually targeted.
Please note that we used a single fault adversarial model, meaning that exactly one
fault was injected during one activation function execution.
After we observed a successful misclassification, we determined the vulnerable in-
structions by visual inspection of the compiled assembly code and by checking the
timing of the laser in that particular fault injection instance. Area of the chip vulnerable
to these disturbances is depicted in Figure 2.
In this exploratory study, we implemented a random neural network, consisting of
3 layers, with 19, 12, and 10 neurons in input layer, hidden layer, and output layer,
respectively. Our fault attack was always targeting the computation of one of the activa-
tion functions in hidden layer. In the following, we will explain the experimental results
on different activation functions in detail.
ReLu. This function is implemented by a following code in C:
if (Accum > 0) {
HiddenLayerOutput[i] = Accum;}
else {
HiddenLayerOutput[i] = 0;}
where i loops from 1 to 12 so that each loop gives one output of the hidden layer. Accum
is an intermediate variable that stores the input of activation function for each neuron.
The assembly code inspection showed that the result of successful attack was exe-
cuting the statement after else such that the output would always be 0. The correspond-
ing assembly code is as follows:
1 ldi r1, 0 ;load 0 to r1
2 cp r1, r15 ;compare MSB of Accum to r1
3 brge else ;jump to else if 0 >= Accum
4 movw r10, r15 ;HiddenLayerOutput[i] = Accum
5 movw r12, r17 ;HiddenLayerOutput[i] = Accum
6 jmp end ;jump after the else statement
7 else: clr r10 ;HiddenLayerOutput[i]= 0
8 clr r11 ;HiddenLayerOutput[i]= 0
9 clr r12 ;HiddenLayerOutput[i]= 0
10 clr r13 ;HiddenLayerOutput[i]= 0
11 end: ... ;continue the execution
where each float number is stored in 4 registers. For example, Accum is stored in regis-
ters r15,r16,r17,r18 and HiddenLayerOutput[i] is stored in r10,r11,r12,r13.
Line 4,5 executes the equation
HiddenLayerOutput[i] = Accum.
The attack was skipping the “jmp end” instruction that would normally avoid the
part of code setting HiddenLayerOutput[i] to 0 in case Accum > 0. Therefore, such
change in control flow renders the neuron inactive no matter what is the input value.
Sigmoid. This function was implemented by a following C code:
HiddenLayerOutput[i] = 1.0/(1.0 + exp(-Accum));
After the assembly code inspection, we observed that the successful attack was taking
advantage of skipping the negation in the exponent of exp() function, which compiles
into one of the two following codes, depending on the compiler version:
A) neg r16 ;compute negation r16
B) ldi r15, 0x80 ;load 0x80 into r15
eor r16, r15 ;xor r16 with r15
Laser experiments showed that both neg and eor could be skipped, and therefore, sig-
nificant change to the function output was achieved.
Hyperbolic tangent. This function was implemented by a following code in C:
HiddenLayerOutput[i] = 2.0/(1.0 + exp(-2*Accum)) - 1;
Similarly to sigmoid, the experiments showed that the successful attack was exploiting
the negation in the exponential function, leading to an impact similar to sigmoid.
Softmax. In case of softmax function, we were unable to obtain any successful mis-
classification. There were only two different outputs as a result of the fault injection:
either there was no output at all, or the output contained invalid values. This lack of
valid output prevented us to do further fault analysis to derive the actual fault model
that happened in the device. Therefore, a thorough analysis of softmax behavior under
faults would be an interesting topic for the future work.
Target activation function Relation between y and y′
ReLu y′ = 0
sigmoid y′ = 1 − y
tanh y′ = −y
Table 1: Relation between correct output y and faulted output y′ when a single fault is
injected in target activation function
If we let y and y′ denote the correct and faulted output of the target activation func-
tion, the relation between y and y′ is summarized in Table 1. For further illustration, the
graph of original and faulted activation functions is depicted in Figure 3.
4 Application to Deep Neural Network
The results from previous section aiming at single functions can be directly used to
alter the behavior of a neural network. In this section we extend the attack to a full
network, while targeting several function computations at once with a multi-fault injec-
tion model. When it comes to deep neural networks, there are three possible places to
introduce a fault:
– Input layer – such fault would be identical to introducing a change at the input data.
Therefore, it is of little interest, since it would be normally easier for the attacker
to directly alter the input data rather than injecting precise faults with an expensive
equipment.
– Hidden layer(s) – since the structure of the hidden layer is normally unknown to
the attacker, she cannot easily predict the outcome of the fault injection. However,
she can still achieve the missclassification, although not necessarily to the class she
decides. Therefore, such attack might be interesting in case the attacker does not
care about the outcome class as long as it is different from the correct outcome.
– Output layer – normally, softmax is the function of choice for the output layer.
According to our results, introducing a meaningful fault into softmax is harder
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Fig. 3: (a) Sigmoid, (b) Hyperbolic tangent, and (c) ReLu functions. Blue lines indicate
original function, red lines indicate faulted ones.
Layer No. of neurons Activation function
Input layer 784 -
Hidden layer 1 500 ReLu
Hidden layer 2 500 ReLu
Hidden layer 3 500 ReLu
Hidden layer 4 n target function
Output layer 10 Softmax
Table 2: Structure of the DNN used in fault injection simulations.
compared to other functions. However, as we discussed, in case the attacker can
alter registers storing the floating point data, she can easily missclasify the outcome
to a chosen class, making it a very powerful attack model.
One might be wondering how can the attacker develop a strategy if the network is un-
known to her. However, as shown recently [6], it is possible to determine the activation
function with a side-channel analysis, i.e. by measuring the power consumption or the
electromagnetic emanation from the device during the computation. Getting the weights
and deciding on attacking particular neurons might be trickier, so in this case, a random
fault model would be the most reasonable assumption for the attacker. Deciding on
what layer to attack, it makes sense to inject the fault as close to the output layer as
possible to make the impact highest. Therefore, for our case, the attacker randomly in-
jects faults into the 4. hidden layer of the network, targeting multiple activation function
computations. In the following we provide evaluation results for such case.
Evaluation on a sample DNN. To test how our attack can influence a real-world
DNN, we trained and evaluated different DNNs with the random fault model described
above. The attack methods considered are described in Section 3.2. We have selected
a popular MNIST dataset [23]. The training of DNNs was accomplished using Keras
(ver.2.1.6) [14] and Tensorflow libraries (ver.1.8.0) [1]. The structures of the DNNs are
detailed in Table 2. For each target function (ReLu, sigmoid and tanh), 8 DNNs with
different number of neurons (n = 15, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80) in hidden layer 4 were
evaluated. We used a partially fixed structure of DNN in order to study the effects of
fault attacks on different activation functions. The prediction accuracy we obtained is
summarized in Table 3. The accuracy shows that although the DNNs we choose are
relatively simple, their accuracy is comparable with the state of the art.
Figures 4 (a) and 4 (b) show a random fault model when attacking the last hidden
layer of the network with 5 and 15 faults, respectively. Success rates are calculated
for 800 random inputs. Naturally, with increasing number of neurons in the layer, the
success rate drops. The figures also show that sigmoid and tanh functions follow the
same trend, which is caused by the same type of fault as explained in the previous
section – skipping the negation in the exponentiation function.
Overall, it can be concluded that if the attacker wants to have a reasonable success
rate (>50%), she should inject faults in at least half of the neurons in the chosen layer,
in case of sigmoid and tanh. For ReLu, she should fault at least 3/4 of the neurons.
Target function ReLu
n 15 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Train. Acc. 97.8 98.9 99.5 99.1 99.2 99.4 99.2 99.1
Test. Acc. 96.6 98.0 98.3 97.6 97.4 98.1 98.1 97.6
Target function sigmoid
n 15 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Train. Acc. 98.9 99.2 98.9 99.2 99.1 99.2 99.0 99.2
Test. Acc. 97.8 97.7 97.7 98.0 98.0 98.1 97.8 98.0
Target function tanh
n 15 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Train. Acc. 98.6 99.2 99.1 99.0 99.0 99.1 99.2 99.0
Test. Acc. 97.4 97.9 97.8 97.8 98.0 97.8 97.9 97.8
Table 3: Training/testing accuracy of DNNs used in evaluation.
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Fig. 4: Injecting (a) 5 and (b) 15 random faults in hidden layer 4.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have proposed the first physical fault injection attack technique on the
major activation functions of deep neural networks. We stated implications how such
attack can alter the behavior of targeted network, together with simulations. Our results
demostrate practicality of the attack on ReLu, sigmoid, and tanh.
For softmax, assuming that we could use single bit flip on each register during the
execution [2], we could target a specific misclassification of the label. Assuming an 8-bit
microcontroller, the floating point data is represented using IEEE 754 standard. Since
the target device is an 8-bit microcontroller, the representation follows 32-bit pattern
(b31...b0), which is stored in 4 registers. The 32-bits consist of: 1 sign bit (b31), 8 biased
exponent bits (b30...b23) and 23 mantissa (fractional) bits (b22...b0). It can be formulated
as: (−1)b31 × 2(b30...b23)2−127 × (1.b22...b0)2. For example, the value 2.43 can be expressed
as (−1)0 × 2(1000000)2−127 ×(1.00110111000010100011111)2. Since 32-bit m is split into
4 bytes, each byte of m is targeted individually. Hence, one can target the exponent
byte on the output neuron for specific label. For example, from the example before,
the first byte will contain 01000000. If bit flip is performed on sixth bit, the resulting
byte will be 01000100 and the corresponding floating point value will be 622.08, and
hence, during softmax computation, the probability for the targeted class will increase
(assuming other values are kept the same) and it will force the algorithm to classify the
data to this class.
This area is still in the beginning phase of research and therefore, it is unclear
what practical consequences can happen when such attack is aimed for example at
autonomous vehicle system or some other critical expert system. While the laser fault
injection, used in our experiments, might not be possible in many scenarios, there are
much simpler ways to disturb the circuits, such as voltage/clock glitching or electro-
magnetic fault injection [4]. In the future, we will also explore such applications.
It will also be interesting to look at possible countermeasures. While there are al-
ready techniques available that correct non-malicious alterations of the processed values
in DNN (due to environmental conditions) [24], the fault tolerance techniques against
malicious entities have to be developed in the same way as in the area of applied cryp-
tography [9,27,15].
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